Security hardening
This page describes Airgate’s built-in protections and the settings you should check before going to production. It is for security reviewers and administrators who harden a deployment. Each section ends with what you should do.
RADIUS: Blast-RADIUS and Message-Authenticator
Section titled “RADIUS: Blast-RADIUS and Message-Authenticator”The Blast-RADIUS attack (CVE-2024-3596) lets an attacker on the path between a network device and the RADIUS server forge an Access-Accept for an Access-Request that carries no Message-Authenticator attribute. Airgate protects against it:
- Each network device has Require Message-Authenticator in Access-Requests, on by default. With it on, the RADIUS service drops Access-Requests from that device that have no valid Message-Authenticator.
- The RADIUS service applies each device’s setting to the requests from that device, and also limits Proxy-State handling (
limit_proxy_state), the other half of the Blast-RADIUS mitigation. - Every CoA and Disconnect request Airgate sends includes a Message-Authenticator.
- A site connector can also drop Access-Requests without Message-Authenticator from local devices before relaying them (
require_message_authenticatorin itsedge.json). - RadSec (RADIUS over TLS, TCP 2083) removes the attack entirely, because the whole exchange is encrypted and authenticated.
- Every Access-Reject is delayed by 1 second to slow down password guessing.
Network › Switches and APs warns when devices do not require Message-Authenticator, and a device’s details show Not required (BlastRADIUS exposure).
What to do
- Leave Require Message-Authenticator in Access-Requests on for every device. Turn it off only for legacy devices that cannot send it, and plan to replace them.
- Use RadSec, directly or through a site connector, wherever RADIUS crosses an untrusted network.
- Use long, random shared secrets, different per device or device group.
Outbound connections: egress policy
Section titled “Outbound connections: egress policy”Administrators configure outbound destinations: directories (LDAP, Active Directory), device sources and context servers, webhooks, SIEM and syslog targets, HTTP enforcement actions. To stop these settings from being used to reach internal services (server-side request forgery), Airgate checks the address it actually connects to, at connection time, against an egress policy. A host name that resolves, or later re-resolves, to a refused address fails to connect.
| Destination | Policy |
|---|---|
Cloud instance metadata addresses (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254, 100.100.100.200, 192.0.0.192, 169.254.170.2) |
Always refused |
Multicast, the limited broadcast address, 240.0.0.0/4 |
Always refused |
Link-local (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) |
Refused unless NAC_EGRESS_ALLOW_LINKLOCAL=true (metadata addresses stay refused) |
Loopback, unspecified, 0.0.0.0/8 |
Refused unless NAC_EGRESS_ALLOW_LOOPBACK=true |
Private ranges (RFC 1918, fc00::/7, 100.64.0.0/10, fec0::/10) |
Allowed by default, because on-premises directories over a site VPN are the normal case; refused when NAC_EGRESS_DENY_PRIVATE=true |
| Public addresses | Allowed |
IPv6 addresses that embed an IPv4 address (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, IPv4-compatible, 6to4, Teredo) are judged by the embedded IPv4 address. Only TCP and UDP connections are allowed.
What to do
- On a deployment that only talks to cloud services, set
NAC_EGRESS_DENY_PRIVATE=true. - Leave the loopback and link-local exceptions off.
Secrets at rest
Section titled “Secrets at rest”Secrets Airgate must be able to use again are encrypted in the database with AES-256-GCM under the deployment’s master key: network device shared secrets, directory bind passwords, certificate authority private keys, OIDC client secrets, integration credentials, and passwords that CHAP or EAP-MD5 need in clear text. Administrator passwords are stored as bcrypt hashes; API client secrets and enrollment tokens as SHA-256 hashes, so they cannot be shown again.
The API and the console never return stored secrets; they show them masked (********). Settings whose names look like secrets (password, secret, token, api_key, private_key, credential) are masked in responses too.
On the appliance the master key is generated at first boot and kept in /opt/airgate/deploy/.env, readable by root only. Backups contain it, encrypted with your backup passphrase.
What to do
- Protect the backup passphrase like the master key itself: together with a backup, it gives access to every secret.
- Restrict SSH access to the appliance (below).
Administrator access
Section titled “Administrator access”- Roles: give each administrator the smallest role that fits: Tenant Administrator, Network Administrator, Help Desk, Guest Operator or Read-only Administrator. Administrators can only grant roles whose permissions they hold. See Permissions and roles.
- Single sign-on and MFA: Airgate has no built-in second factor. Connect your identity provider with console single sign-on (SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect) and enforce MFA and conditional access there. Map identity provider groups to Airgate roles; a user who loses every mapped group is refused at the next sign-in.
- Passwords and lockout: local passwords have at least 8 characters (the first administrator created at setup at least 12). Ten failed sign-ins lock an account for 15 minutes.
- Sessions: console tokens last 8 hours; API client tokens 1 hour. Changing a role or password, disabling an account or signing out revokes every token issued to that account.
- API clients: use one per integration, with the narrowest role, and rotate the secret when someone who knew it leaves.
What to do
- Set up single sign-on with MFA for administrators, and keep one local platform administrator with a strong password in a vault for emergencies.
- Review Settings › Administrators and Settings › API keys every quarter and remove unused accounts.
Audit log
Section titled “Audit log”Every change made in the console or through the API is recorded in Settings › Audit log with the time, the actor (administrator, API client or system), the source IP address, the object and the changed fields. Console sign-ins, password changes and resets, debug logging, packet captures, certificate revocation, software updates, backups and restores are recorded too. Audit details never contain secrets.
What to do
- Export audit events to your SIEM with Settings › Log export (topic
admin.audit) so they are kept outside Airgate.
Console and web security
Section titled “Console and web security”- The console, API and portals are served over HTTPS with TLS 1.2 or later. Use a certificate from a CA your browsers trust; see Console access and certificates.
- The console sends a strict Content-Security-Policy (scripts only from Airgate itself, no framing),
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniffand a restrictive referrer policy. API responses are not cached. - Forwarding headers are trusted only from the configured reverse proxies, so a client cannot fake the address that gets logged.
The appliance
Section titled “The appliance”- The appliance is built from Ubuntu 24.04 LTS with automatic security updates on.
- Each appliance gets its own machine ID and SSH host keys at first boot.
rootcannot sign in over SSH; theairgateuser signs in with the password set at first boot (at least 12 characters) and usessudo.- The update agent accepts only updates signed with Airgate’s release key (Software updates).
What to do
- Allow SSH (TCP 22) only from your administration network, or not at all and use the VM console.
- Allow the console (TCP 443) only from the networks that need it. Guests and BYOD users need the portals; site connectors need the console address.
- Keep the appliance up to date and back it up daily to an SFTP server.
Site connectors
Section titled “Site connectors”- Connectors only connect outbound; they need no inbound firewall rule.
- Each connector authenticates with its own API token and, in certificate mode, its own RadSec client certificate, which it renews by itself. Enrollment tokens are single-use, expire, and are stored as hashes.
- Disabling a connector refuses its API calls, RadSec connections, relayed RADIUS, CoA and TACACS+ tunnels at once; replacing it revokes the old certificate.
- On a Linux host the connector runs as an unprivileged user with only the capabilities to bind low ports and capture packets, and a hardened systemd unit.
- Active Directory password checks send only the MS-CHAP challenge and response to the connector; Airgate deletes them as soon as the check ends.