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Authentication methods

An authentication method is the way a user or device proves who it is. This page describes each method Airgate supports, what the device and your directories must provide, and how to choose between them.

Method Proves Credential Best for
EAP-TLS The device holds a certificate from a CA you trust Client certificate Managed laptops and phones (Intune SCEP, BYOD portal). The strongest option, no passwords.
PEAP (EAP-MSCHAPv2) The user knows a password User name and password Windows and phones signing in with a directory password.
EAP-TTLS (inner PAP or EAP-MSCHAPv2) The user knows a password User name and password Password sign-in against directories that only verify cleartext passwords, such as Entra ID, Okta or Google Workspace (inner PAP).
MAC authentication (MAB) Nothing: the MAC address is only an identifier MAC address Printers, cameras, IoT and other devices without an 802.1X supplicant.
PAP The user knows a password Password sent to the NAD Web login from a captive portal, VPN gateways, legacy devices.
CHAP, MS-CHAP The user knows a password Challenge-response Legacy devices and VPNs.

On Access › Access policies, a policy’s Allowed methods offers EAP-TLS, PEAP and EAP-TTLS for an 802.1X policy, plus PAP, CHAP and MS-CHAP for Any sign-in. A MAC authentication policy chooses Any device or Known devices only instead. A request with a method the policy does not allow is rejected (error 9002).

Directories differ in how they can check a password. Airgate’s RADIUS server must either receive a password hash it can check itself, or hand the cleartext password to a directory that can verify it.

Directory EAP-TLS lookup PEAP / MS-CHAP EAP-TTLS (PAP) / PAP CHAP
Local users Yes Yes (NT hash stored) Yes Only with Store reversible passwords
Guest accounts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Active Directory Yes Only with a domain join (appliance or site connector) Yes (LDAP bind) No
Generic LDAP Yes With a password attribute that holds an NT hash or cleartext Yes With a cleartext password attribute
Generic SQL DB Yes With an NT hash or cleartext password column Yes With a cleartext password column
Microsoft Entra ID Yes (Graph) No Yes (ROPC) No
Okta Yes (with an API token) No Yes No
Google Workspace Yes No Yes (LDAP bind) No
HTTP (REST) With a lookup path No With a verify path No
RADIUS server, Token server No No Yes (PAP proxy) No

Active Directory never hands out password hashes. For PEAP-MSCHAPv2 with AD accounts, a domain controller must check each password: the Airgate appliance or a site connector joins the domain and asks a domain controller with Samba ntlm_auth. When a domain-joined site connector is online, it is asked first. See PEAP-MSCHAPv2 with Active Directory.

The device presents a client certificate inside a TLS handshake. Airgate:

  1. checks that the certificate chains to a CA the tenant trusts for Wi-Fi client certificates: the tenant’s own Onboard CA, or a CA imported under Certificates › Trusted CAs with that purpose. Public CAs are never trusted for client certificates;
  2. checks that the certificate is valid and not revoked (for certificates the tenant’s CA issued, the certificate status is checked directly; the RADIUS server also asks the OCSP responder);
  3. takes the user name from the certificate, by default its subject CN;
  4. by default, looks that user name up in the policy’s directories (Check accounts in) to fetch groups and attributes. A user name that no directory knows is rejected as User not found;
  5. fills the Certificate namespace (subject, issuer, SANs, serial number, validity) and, for an Intune certificate with an IntuneDeviceId:// URI SAN, Certificate:Intune-Device-Id.

The device must also trust Airgate’s RADIUS server certificate (the EAP server identity under Certificates › Server certificates), usually by having the Airgate root CA installed and the server name set in its Wi-Fi profile.

The built-in EAP-TLS method [EAP TLS] has these settings, which can be changed through the API:

Setting Default Meaning
username_from CN Where the user name comes from: CN, SAN-UPN, SAN-Email, SAN-DNS or the EAP Identity.
authorization_required true Look the user name up in the policy’s directories; reject when not found.
certificate_comparison none Also require the certificate CN (cn), a SAN (san) or either (cn_or_san) to equal the user name.
session_resumption true Allow TLS session resumption (fast reconnect). A resumed session is re-checked against the account.

PEAP builds a TLS tunnel with Airgate’s RADIUS server certificate, then runs an inner method inside it. The built-in [EAP PEAP] method allows the inner methods EAP-MSCHAPv2 and EAP-GTC. EAP-MSCHAPv2 is what Windows, macOS, iOS and Android use by default for “user name and password” Wi-Fi.

  • The device must trust Airgate’s RADIUS server certificate. Without it, the device ends the handshake and the Sign-in log shows The device didn’t trust Airgate’s RADIUS certificate (code 9020).
  • The password check needs a directory that supports MS-CHAP (see the table above).
  • A TLS session resumed through another tenant’s NAD is refused and needs a full authentication.

EAP-TTLS also builds a TLS tunnel with Airgate’s server certificate. The built-in [EAP TTLS] method allows the inner methods PAP and EAP-MSCHAPv2. With inner PAP the cleartext password travels inside the tunnel, so any directory that can verify passwords works, including Microsoft Entra ID, Okta and Google Workspace.

The NAD sends the device’s MAC address as the user name (MAB on a switch port, MAC authentication on an SSID). Airgate looks the MAC address up in Devices (the [Endpoints Repository]).

  • With Known devices only, a device not in Devices is rejected before the rules run.
  • With Any device, every device reaches the rules, which can test Device is, Device is in MAC list, Device type is and the device’s compliance facts.
  • A device whose status is Disabled is rejected (code 202).
  • MAC authentication proves nothing about the device. Give MAC-authenticated devices only the access they need.

MAC authentication is also the first step of guest captive portals and of Wi-Fi passes. See Guest access.

These methods are not tunnelled. PAP carries the password protected only by the RADIUS shared secret; it is what a captive portal’s web login and many VPN gateways send. CHAP needs the cleartext password on the server side; MS-CHAP needs the NT hash.

Windows can sign in to 802.1X as the computer before a user logs on. Airgate treats a sign-in as a machine authentication when:

  • the PEAP or EAP-TTLS identity has the form host/<computer name>, or
  • an EAP-TLS identity has the form host/<computer name> and the certificate names that computer (CN or a DNS SAN).

A machine authentication sets Authentication:Machine to true and adds the [Machine Authenticated] tag. Airgate remembers the device’s MAC address for 24 hours by default. When a user later signs in from the same device, that sign-in also carries Authentication:Machine = true and the [Machine Authenticated] tag, alongside [User Authenticated]. A rule can therefore require “a company computer and a valid user”.

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